Walter Russell Mead (ROUGH TRANSCRIPT)
In which we discuss the Israel lobby myth, the American-Israel relationship, foreign policy, Iran nuclear deal, "The Arc of a Covenant," and anti-Semitism.
The following is a rough transcript of our conversation with Walter Russell Mead (Don’t Blame Israel on the Jews).
Please note that this is a full, rough, unedited transcript. If you’d like us to polish and edit these transcripts, please consider supporting Uncertain Things as a paid subscriber!
Adaam: Hey, Vanessa.
Vanessa: Hi, Adaam
Adaam: welcome to autumn.
Vanessa: Yeah, it's fall. I'm somewhat happy about it.
Adaam: Oh, I'm nothing but overjoyed.
Vanessa: No, I'm conflicted. I'm a summer person.
Adaam: Well, speaking of hot summers today, we talk about Israel with Walter russell Mead,
Vanessa: a gentleman, a scholar author of many books, including arc of a covenant. Uh, uh, also the James Clark chase professor of foreign affairs and humanities at barred college columnist for the wall street journal and scholar at the Hudson Institute.
Adaam: So in his new book, the arc of a covenant, he. Tries to figure out why is the United States relationship with Israel the way it is mm-hmm and the answer obviously is filthy Jewish money,
Vanessa: right, the Kabal
Adaam: the Kabal the Jews,
Vanessa: the Jews air quotes.
Adaam: So obviously, no, he, his, the whole point of delving into this, this tone was to dispel some of those prejudicial views about, uh, the Jews and the Rothchilds and prove that it's not all about the Benjamins to show that the United States doesn't support Israel, simply because the Jews are this tentacular creature holding the world in its embrace
Vanessa: Svengali types.
Adaam: Exactly. So if you read the book and I 110% recommend you do, you'll discover that it's. More like that in every step of the way, leading up to the founding of Israel, the opinion of the Jews probably mattered the least mm-hmm nor by the way, is it just about Judaic evangelicals who are trying to precipitate the end times through Israel?
Because a Jewish Homeland in Israel is an integral piece of their eschatology. In fact, one of the best things about reading this book is that in every turn it shows how unpin downable history is mm-hmm and that any attempt to shove it into a single facile narrative is just bound to. Oh, and by the way, worth noting, Walter is not himself of the Jewish persuasion.
He's coming at his questions from the perspective of, uh, perplexed Christian. Who's truly interested in understanding how these foreign policy cliches have embedded themselves in the American mind. So we talk about the reasons that people end up developing false understandings of history. We talk about the trace antisemitism and Orientalism that add all the mind of Westerners when they think talk and make policies about the east mm-hmm
We talk about current affairs at the end, which is, I guess, mostly for, uh, foreign affairs wants like myself. Um, but, but we get there and we even even launch it off by what, a better way to launch it off with a Madla tweet. So.
Vanessa: And one thing that is interesting about this conversation, and we start off the conversation, uh, with this observation is that usually when we're talking about foreign affairs, we are lamenting the fact that the us looks at the world through the prism of its own understandings and dynamics. And so it kind of places, American dynamics upon the rest of the world, even when it doesn't make any sense. And interestingly, in this, in this conversation, we talk about why, for some reason, people insist on thinking that Americans have nothing to do with their relationship with Israel.
Adaam: Right? suddenly America has no agency.
Vanessa: Right. Um, and, and so, and so we talk about that UN unusual inversion, uh, and, and in fact it is, it is, as it usually is, it is just America seeing the world through its own prism. But for some reason, it's just not seen as, as that reality, which, which takes us to the idea of preconceived notions. If you wanna get there.
Adaam: Oh, oh, I think I'm gonna hold on this wonderful segue. Okay. Okay. In order to remind you that we are uncertain things on uncertain, doub stack.com, where you can find extra content, including essays, and, uh, even a special episode for paid members about the trauma plot. As a follow up to our conversation with Christine Rosen,
Vanessa: The Wire fans will definitely enjoy that B bonus content
Adaam: and if you wanna support us, please give us a five star review on apple podcasts, because that helps a lot, a lot. And share us with your friends and enemies. Because, because, because, because, so before we go, we have, uh, is it an announcement.
Vanessa (2): We have a, a, a fun proclamation. a fun recommendation for another podcast in, in the posse that you may also be interested in, um, as an uncertain things, listeners, it's called preconceived. It's hosted by Zale Mednic. It examines the preconceptions that shape how we view the world and it challenges paradigms by which we live our lives. So on each episode, the host is Al he talks to researchers, experts, other luminaries. And he examines, you know, both our approach to how we, how we make major life decisions, but he also like examines our perspectives that we may have never really challenged and that we may have been overly conditioned towards.
Um, there's a couple episodes that I think will particularly appeal to uncertain things, listeners. Um, there's an interesting one on the malleability of human memory, for example, with Elizabeth Loftus, uh, who's a psychology and memory expert. I enjoyed the one on polyamory with Dr. Eli chef. I'm quite curious about, uh, relat non-standard relationships. And so that one was interesting for me to unpack. Um, but there are
Adaam: one of our first conversations of our, in our lives, in our shared liveness. It was about polyamory. Actually. You taught me the phrase. Yeah. Yeah. Back in your Harlem apartment.
Vanessa: Oh, wow. I knew about polyamory 2014. Look at me, me.
Adaam: I, I just took the concept for granted. And you told me no, there was a stupid term for it.
Vanessa: and it's only gotten more popular since then. So if you're curious about it, you've been of listen to that [crosstalk]. I don't know. I dunno. Let's like, let's shelve that for an uncertain things episode. Um, but yeah. So listen to Preconceived wherever you get your podcasts, check them out.
Adaam: Hooray. Hooray for the ad swap
Vanessa: Huray we are, we are getting bigger and bolder in this world of podcasting.
Adaam: Yeah. And if you have a podcast that, uh, you think our audience would dig, then
Vanessa: send it our way and we can, we can do a little promo swap let's let's let's build our audiences together.
Adaam: um, in, in this polyamorous podcasting world of ours.
Vanessa: Exactly.
Adaam: And with that
Vanessa: Walter Russell Mead
Adaam: let me, uh, preamble by saying that I am. I, I woke up absolutely sick may or may not be COVID who cares? Um, so if I, if I talk nonsense, then just like Chuck it to my disease madness.
Walter Russell Mead: I'll just take that as a license to answer the questions I want to talk about
Adaam: exactly my point.
Walter Russell Mead: [crosstalk] that's his dementia speaking. I can ignore it
Adaam: exactly. Just usurp authority and take over the pod. so, so, okay. We're gonna introduce you in, in your, your great book, the arc of the covenant at the top. I think it's, it's an excellent book and really it's one of those books that I just think everybody should, um, read anybody. Who's
Vanessa: Adaam's been losing sleep at night because he can't stop reading.
Adaam: I really it's true. And there, and there are some parts there that I just, you know, I'm from Israel and it's this topic that I thought about a lot studied and argued about PLE. And yet this is a book that is, uh, necessary compendium
Vanessa: It also made you think in new ways about things that you thought you would kind of close the book on. So to speak.
Adaam: So one great point, and I think let's start, there is a recurring rant of mine, and I've even recently wrote about this for a Newsweek about the, the, the damage in the American conversation to talk about everything foreign affairs, through the lens of American politics, using the entire world as just mirror to Americanism, um, which, which often leads to really terrible, dumb, shallow conversations, but reading your book.
I realize that when talking about the, the core issue of the book of which is the, the relationship between Israel and in America and, and how it develop. It's actually almost the inverse because people see Israel as it's soy generous, not real, like as if it's, it's having undo influence in the us and is actually manipulating the, uh, in some way for, and for whatever reason is manipulating the national interest in ways that are completely outside of the scope of American politics.
And in fact, in this particular case, we might use a little more of what I call American solipsism of looking rather than external forces, but at America and asking why does the United States relationship with Israel look the way he does based on American interests? So let's start there.
Walter Russell Mead: It's true that, that a lot of people sort of look at Israel and assume that it has some kind of amazing a cult influence over American policy and American politic.
We should probably start from the fact that every country tries to influence the politics and policies of other countries. The United States spends billions of dollars a year, trying to influence politics and policy in other countries. And we are certainly not alone in that. This is what becomes unusual is that Israel is seen.
Much more successful than other countries at doing this. You listen to what people say and it's often, I won't say they're conscious anti-Semites because I'm really not the moral arbiter of the state of the world's souls, but they fall back and, and reliably use certain classical anti-Semitic Trop. So Jews are more powerful than everybody else because the Jews run the media and because the Jews are so rich, they just buy everybody.
Vanessa: And for those who can't see, uh, Walter is doing air quotes when he says the Jews.
Adaam: Yes.
Walter Russell Mead: The Jews. Oh, okay. Uh, yes,
Adaam: because the tone sounded so sincere.
Vanessa: right. If you couldn't pick up all that,
Walter Russell Mead: right, right. Uh, I'll have to learn verbal air quotes. the art of the verbal air quote. But if you really look at it, there is a much closer relationship between perceived American interest and our policy toward Israel than people might think.
I mean, for example, when Israel was small and weak, uh, and really could have used a lot of help from the United States, the United States was completely indifferent. In fact hostile under the Eisenhower administration, the us saw Nassar, not Israel as the key to our middle east policy. And actually at one point we were even discussing with the British a plan to force Israel to give up the ne a desert as part of a peace plan.
Israel, as I say in the book did not become strong because it had an American Alliance. It, it got an American Alliance because it had become strong. Really. I think when you, when you look at it, what you find is that American policy toward Israel is actually more li we make that policy more like the way we make policy toward other countries, but at the same time, the position of Israel in American discourse and in American consciousness is very different from that of, or really any other country, a comparison.
Adaam: I think you make in the introduction, if I remember correctly, which, uh, was just so clarifying in taking that same formulation. Which applies to any kind of pressure group in politics and the misconceptions around it. Like Democrats focus a lot about the outsized influence the NRA has over Washington, but as you point out the truth is that people don't love guns because the NRA is powerful.
The NRA is powerful because people love guns. That's. there is almost a, uh, I I'd say a wishful simplicity in seeing all your political woes associated with one organization that if we can only beat it, if we can only bring down the NRA, then all our problems with, with gun proliferation in America will be solved.
If we can only undermine APAC or at least prides clutches from the heart of American foreign policy, then there'll be a two state solution.
Walter Russell Mead: That's right. I think, you know, fundamentally the idea is that Israel cannot become strong as a state through the normal things that states do. Building an army, building an economy, technological capability, building an intelligence service, having effective diplomacy.
Israel's strength doesn't come from any of those sources. It comes from sneaky Jews doing sneaky Jewish things, controlling the media, controlling the banks. So Israel is only strong for people who think this way because the us is backing it. And if we could just break the us Israel connection, then Israel would fall.
And the way to break the us Israel connection is to attack the quote, air quote, Jewish lobby that is holding that AR artificially holding that support in place allegedly. And so you have mm-hmm in that sense, antisemitism is elevated into a strategy of countering Israel.
One of the things I say in the book is that unintentionally antisemites have all along, been some of Israel's biggest supporters and allies, right?
Because their own antisemitism leads them to very incorrect AEs and strategically misguided approaches and diverts them. You know, they say in, uh, in the bull fighting ring, the, the bull is always distracted by the Matador's red Cape. It goes for the Cape, not the legs. And in many ways, historically Israel has been a prime beneficiary of the fuzzy thinking that antisemitism tends to.
Cause can you give an example? Well, I think for me, the most prominent example of anti-Semitism helping Israel is when so many Arab countries expel their Jews, following the Israeli war of independence. Without those Jews today who constitute middle Eastern Jews constitute the largest demographic group of Israeli Jews.
Israel today would be a much smaller country. Um, there would be no real pressure for settlements on the west bank. It would also, it would be a much weaker country with a smaller army smaller economy, and it would also be a much more left wing country. Hmm. Because if you think about how those Arab Jews have influenced the political evolution of Israel, the liquid party would not be in government without them.
Right. And so actions taken sort of by anti SEMS, trying to punish the Jews for things that Israel have done actually redacted enormously to Israel's benefit over the years.
Adaam: That's interesting.
Vanessa: So I wanna, I wanna pick up on a little bit on this thread of antisemitism because you, and even in our conversation, but also I think in the book you may, you would do make a distinction between.
The individual having anti-Semitic feelings towards Jewish people versus a kind of more collective or cultural anti-Semitism that permeates. And I, and I wanna kind of parse that through, because I think that's, that's important to understand how that's influencing American perceptions about the American Jewish Israeli relationship.
And, and you also make the point that when you see kind of the bouts of antisemitism and American culture, that tells us more about how Americans are feeling about the American project than about anything to do with Israel, Jewish people themselves. So would you mind kind of talking about this more collective antisemitism and what it says about us?
Walter Russell Mead: Well, you, can you find that going, you know, pretty far back in Western history and certainly a achieving a kind of recognizable form in the early middle ages, There, you know, there's this sense of this, of the Jews as, as this small minority whose weakness is only superficial, actually, they're quite strong.
They're in league with your enemies abroad. They have an, they wield an, a cult economic influence that'll gives them enormous political influence. And in some ways this was linked to the weakness of medieval Christian society, where you think about sort of in the, in the so-called dark ages, the, uh, the state say of France, it's very weak.
It's really the king and 20 people who ride around with the king. Uh, there's no police force. There's no government bureaucracy. There's, you know, his, his feudal rinse come in the form of cabbage and RBAs, um, you know, it's not, it, it's not powerful. And what makes it powerful is opinion that people believe the king is God's anointed ruler.
They believe that the church is telling them to obey the, the king. And so when you have a group of people in the middle of this society who don't share many of these basic beliefs, and because people don't know much about what the Jews think, they don't know which of these beliefs they share and don't share because actually Jews were being taught to pray for the wellbeing of the countries that they live in and to obey the laws and so on.
But that's, that's not what people know outside the community. So they're seen as a threat to the cohesion of society, all out of proportion to their numbers. And then these medieval societies that are constantly threatened with invasion from the outside barbarian invasions from the east, the Vikings from the north, the Muslims from the.
The fact that the Jews have, or have, or are believed to have all kinds of connections and correspondences with people in these other realms makes them even more an object of suspicion. And then you throw, um, superstition. Well, if the Jews reject Christ then must be that they've chosen, actively chosen to serve evil.
And so anything is possible of people who do this, they are doing witchcraft they're causing plagues, whatever. So the, the figure of the Jew in America, in Western culture assumes this powerful threatening aspect, even though the individual Jew in front of you is weak and powerless, and really has no protection.
Um, now that cultural meme enters the general sort of culture in ways that people are not necessarily conscious of. So, and also can become disassociated. You can have somebody who has a lot of Jewish friends, but still thinks of Jewish power as some sort of a cult thing. Uh, so, and you can have all kinds of people who believe in religious tolerance and so on.
And yet also believe in another corner of their minds because people are not necessarily logical or, you know, consistent in the way they do things still have this inherited stock of ideas and prejudice never recognizes itself a racist. Usually won't say I'm a racist, a racist will say, no, these are not prejudices.
These are based on observation. These are facts that I believe.
Vanessa: So in, in terms of the American context, then would you say. American America is more prone to antisemitism in moments where it feels like America itself is weaker. Like these kinds of influences from Christianity or, or Western thought kind of infiltrate more easily when there is inherent feeling of vulnerability in America as a, as a country.
Walter Russell Mead: I think, I mean, I think that's true, but let's, let's draw it out a little bit. Uh, because one of the things that, that I found as I, as I researched the book is that the basis of Jewish acceptance in America is subtly different from the basis of Jewish acceptance in Europe. And it's a subtle difference, but it has profound implications for antisemitism and the strength of antisemitism in Europe.
The, the idea was that if the Jews give up their identity as a people. Then the Jews can be accepted as Frenchman. You're a French citizen of Jewish origin. You're a German citizen of Jewish origin, but you give up the idea that there's a Jewish people of which you're also a member.
Adaam: And this also goes to what we, uh, talked about with Tom Holland and Tom Perico regarding the invention quote, unquote of religion, where religion becomes a tool that can allow you to have a freedom of conscience without an association to the tribe or the people or the nation.
And that's the process that Europe, the Protestant of all of Europe, in a sense where you can, it's, it's a question of denomination that we can be pluralistic about, but you still, um, value your loyalty to the, the nation, right?
Walter Russell Mead: Well, in the, in the middle ages, it was the kind of Christian Republic of Europe.
That was trying to be a holistic society in the modern period. Each European nation tried to create a smaller holistic society. So Hungary for the Hungarians, France, for the French, et cetera. Uh, and in both places, the, the possibility of the Jews as a, as a minority who shares some aspects of the collective identity, but not others becomes a real flashpoint, right?
The American approach to the Jews, the Jewish question, whatever we wanna call it was, was suddenly different in that from the beginning am American identity is pluralistic. That is in 1770 very few Americans thought of themselves as Americans. You were a south Carolinian or you were a New Hampshire. I. Or you were a British citizen in, in America, whatever, but the, the union of the colonies is a union of sub identities. And on the religious level, at the same time, there was a lot of religious diversity, mostly within Protestantism. But so you had Anglicans, you had Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, Quakers, et cetera.
So that Amer and all of them are all of these sub tribes are under the American umbrella. So the Jew and, and, you know, then you get immigrants coming in and they basically get treated in the same way.
So Irish Americans, well, they're an ethnic denomination and they're, they're mostly Catholic. And it was a stretch to include Catholics in a Protestant America, but people managed after, after a certain amount of, of struggle and horror, um, to accept them.
And the Jewish people as a religious group, but also a kind of national group, could be seen on the, you know, see
We have Irish, we have Jews, we have Poles, we have all of these different kinds of Americans. And so there was no conflict in the American mind between Jews saying, "I'm a member of the Jewish people, the Jewish people are a nation. Our nation should have a state," and an Irish person saying, "I'm an American, but I think the British should get out of Ireland. And I want American foreign policy not to help Britain control Ireland." So the presence of Jews in America from the beginning is grounded in this idea of America as a tribe of tribes, a nation of nations.
Now, when we start doubting as a people whether that's really true, for example, if we start saying this concept of the American nation was actually a very subtle form of white supremacy, it's a way of allowing all of these white groups to come together in order to marginalize people of color. All right. Once you start attacking the validity of that historic concept, then all kinds of questions come back to the fore. And one of them is, what are the Jews doing in America? Who are they? What do they want? How do they relate to other groups in the United States?
And so at times, you know, during the 1880s and early 20th century, when the industrial revolution was throwing everything into chaos, and we had mass immigration, you saw a rise in antisemitism. During the depression you saw a tremendous rise in antisemitism. And I think today we're seeing something a bit similar, where on the left and the right, you have people who no longer have confidence that the American dream is a real thing. And it's exactly from those groups in our society where we're seeing a reemergence of antisemitism.
So it's, it's a, um, I'm trying to remember, uh, the name, uh, was it McLoughlin father Kauflin Kauflin that? So that's like the, the unique. American antisemitism that comes in ages of populism and, and vulnerability, but it's can you, I, I, you're saying that it's a questioning of what the role of the Jew is in American society, but I it's, it still seems always foreign to me, to the American bloodstream and, and, and a different type of antisemitism.
If you can explain a little bit what the, the variant is, because it's very different to the, to the language and thought of European antisemitism.
Well, you know, part of it too, is that in America, the role of the other that is played by Jews in, in much of Europe is actually their com they're competitors for the role of the other.
Um, and so is it black people? Is it Hispanics? Is it, you know, Chinese coming from the far east to San Francisco in the 19th century? Um, is it Roman Catholics and actually for many Protestant intellectuals, um, in America, in the early 20th century, the Jews were less of a worry than the Catholics, um, in part, because in part, because at that time, the Catholic church, you know, actually at an official level was, was anti-American in or anti certain principles that were seen as foundational to American life.
Um, and so you could, you know, so the Jews were smaller numerically and also less visibly hostile to the core tenants. In fact, enthusiastically for in large part embracing many of the core tenants of American life.
Adaam: I, yeah, I wanna move to other areas or topics that confound our ability to have a discussion in, in America about its relationship with Israel. At the beginning of the book, you mentioned you have a small list of , let's call it confounding variables. And you mentioned Orientalism and I'd love for you to get into that. A little bit.
Walter Russell Mead: Orientalism, uh, was originally, I guess, really in its current form was developed by Edward Sied. It was a Palestinian American academic and kind of used it as a, as a club against some of the American scholarship in particular people like Bernard Lewis, uh, who he saw as, uh, being pro anti Palestinian, pro Israeli as part of a larger bias against the Arab world and Arab peoples, which was related to their role as he saw to being intellectuals in service to an Imperial project of, of domination of the.
Adaam: And his point was that the calling it been prejudices, almost an understatement, but that the twisted fetishized perception of the east that, uh, European colonialists have developed has permeated all levels of culture to the point that they can't help, but produce policies that just view the east as, as an object to be raped, right. Rather than its own autonomous identity.
Walter Russell Mead: And this, I think, you know, is not an unfair assessment of some mm-hmm of the scholarship. I, you know, Bernard Lewis and some other people I think were much more intellectually serious than, than they're being given credit for. But what I do, what I try to do in the book is, is point back to particularly in the late forties and early fifties where the so-called Arabist in the state department and in the British foreign service who were very anti Israel.
And in many cases, antisemitic were very pro Arab in their emotional attachments, but their job was to maintain the British empire in the Arab world and in the American state department to keep the Arabs from jacking up the price of oil and, and accepting the, the role of American oil companies in those places.
So there, you know, there was a, there was clearly an Orientalism there among the Arabist, um, and criticism of it is legitimate. But what I think then I, I, I write about what I call an Orientalism of the left, which is there's a way in which people on the left sort of in their own way, kind of fetishize Arab resistance to the.
So that the idea is that every Palestinian is a militant anti-rail activist, that every Arab leader is constantly, you know, is gonna be triggered if America does something about Israel or, or that Arabs are incapable of seeing, or, you know, the Arab hatred of Israel is so all consuming and all pervasive that they're unable to sort of differentiate.
This is a, this is a form of diminishing the human complexity of Arabs. Who are extremely sophisticated players of power politics.
Adaam: And the point here in to cuz I can imagine listeners already hearing this as a moral judgment. You know, Orientalism means that Europe sees all Arab nations, it's good or all Arab nations it's bad. It's not just about moral judgment. Even it's probably least about moral judgment, but about the oversimplification of a region and it's reduction to, uh, a false vision and that false vision can be, um, infantilizing or that false vision can be idolizing. But the point is both visions are not connected to, like you said, the complexity of human decision making and the internal regional politics.
I think you point out how Egypt was more in, in the early days of Israel was probably more comfortable with Israel's founding because it created a barrier against the British supported mite family in Jordan and those, those nuances of politics. Are reduced when you just see everything as the story of the Aboriginal plucky, uh, Oriental native fighting against the domineering ental implant
Walter Russell Mead: right now, this is easier to see now with the Abraham Accords, where there's sort of common fear of Iran. Plus their common lack of confidence in the United States has led a number of Arab states and Israel to begin to work together. And the Abraham accord is sort of one visible aspect of a. The tip of an iceberg of some deeper cooperation. So the Abraham Accords
Adaam: in case, um, people aren't aware is the agreements that have been facilitated under the Trump administration, normalizing relationship between Israel and a number of Muslim countries. It started with the Emirates and then it expanded to include Sudan and brain Bahrain. And I don't know if Morocco is part of the deal, but it's, but it's definitely also FOD relations with Israel as a result.
Walter Russell Mead: Right. But in every case, these were, you know, Arab countries following absolutely traditional rayon de top, uh, you know, national interests politics, because Arabs are as smart as anybody else and are as capable of developing a sophisticated recognition of their national interest.
Now, an Israeli, an Israeli would be an idiot to think this meant that they love us. Right. Um, you know, or that they say, wow, it's a great thing that the Jews came to the middle east. I'm so glad there's a Jewish state in sine. This is not that at all.
Adaam: Oh Oh, let me tell you, they are Israelis who think that
Walter Russell Mead: look, you know, there are, you know, there are plenty look there, you know, people are sentimentalized international politics in all kinds of ways. And sometimes the people who sentimentalize it are actually policy makers. So it's a complicated reality but the, um, but really the, you know, this is, this is simp. This is the Arab world, surprising everybody by its be ability to behave like normal human beings, which in fact they are. And do
Adaam: I wonder, I wanna actually jump on this point that the, um, people tend to sentimentalize international affairs. I think this is one. Issue that I keep coming back to, and I'm gonna use that as an excuse to talk about the, um, what you refer to as the authorization of the eschaton. And we'll get into that phrase, but generally the, the part of the American mind that seas, or has seen basically from the founding, the story of America as being the harbinger of a new world, a new era, and one that will be, um, more enlightened and will end up shaping the world in its image.
And that, that is a combination of the, the myth of progress from the enlightenment, as well as, um, Christian eschatology. But I want you to delve deeply into all of that, but just to, to frame it into the way that this. I guess emotional attachment to the narrative of America's historical purpose and direction ends up influencing decision makers in the foreign policy realm.
Walter Russell Mead: Okay. Well, it's certainly clear to anybody who looks at the, the history that even before there was an American Republic, one of the characteristics that animated a lot of folks in what is now, the us was a belief that the American experiments that the colonists were conducting had some kind of major global consequences.
And, and these people were operating, you know, out of a certain out of a template that was, it's an Anglo American template that, you know, there was the great ancient world and the Greeks and the Romans and the Jews were noble, wonderful people. And we had a high civilization and Christianity came and you had a great religion, but then come the dark ages and everything goes bad.
And instead of Republican Liberty, you have tyranny instead of true religion, you have superstition, et cetera, et cetera. But then in stages, the world starts getting better. And religious people said, God is doing it. Other people came up with the force or whatever is doing it. But first it's the, the Renaissance where the knowledge of classical antiquity is uncovered again.
Then you have the reformation, which for Protestants is when the sort of original purity of the Christian religion is restored. Then in England, you have the glorious revolution of 1688 in which the principles of classical Liberty are once again being applied, Americans saw the revolution of 1776 as the next step in this and the scientific enlightenment.
Meanwhile, is giving humanity the ability to go higher and further than the classical age ever did. And
so America comes into the world, riding the momentum of this tremendous storm of progress and optimism. And they see, they see, you know, they, they look at the size of the territories that lie open to the United States.
They look at America's position as a leading, even in the 1790s, a leading technological country at the cutting edge of so many developments. And they say it's O it, it must, it's, it's clear that America is destined to be a great power. And, and then the hour in human history at which America is, is becoming great.
Isn't just another time. It's the time when all, when this revolution and restoration is moving toward a climax. And so America's rise is the rise of all humanity. Now one thing they immediately start doing and you see this all through the 19th century is they say this new revolution is gonna come and, uh, rescue the great peoples, the fallen peoples of classical antiquity, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Jews.
And so America, when the Greeks revolt against the Ottoman empire Americans actually go over to help the Greeks fight and win their war of independence. They raise money for the Greeks and so on Julia Ward, how, who wrote the battle? Him of the Republic, her husband was a decorated hero of the Greek war for independence, a new England, uh, and in the same way, the Americans were wildly enthusiastic about the Italian unification and Gar Baldi.
They wanted to make Garabaldi a general in the American civil war for the, by the way, not for the Confederacy. And the, um, here, the idea too, is these peoples, as they recover their freedom, and if they engage in virtuous democracy, their greatness will return and everybody will see that the American way works, that it can restore the lost glory and the Jews for many 19th century Americans, both, both religious and non-religious secular liberals as well.
See them as the great, in a way test case that if the Jew, you know, if the Jews return to Palestine now, and by the way, in, in antiquity, Greece, Italy, and Palestine were all considered these lush, rich places you read the Bible and Israel is just the land of milk and milk. And honey. Yeah. Right. You read the Greek poets and it's just this amazingly rich lush countryside, ditto, Italy.
In the 19th century, they were all very kind of poor and backward, malaria and everything. So, you know, when, when the Jews then finally start going back to Israel, finally, the Americans would say, um, and they start farming and they start organizing themselves as a democracy. And then they start becoming, instead of becoming despised and marginal, they start regaining their reputation and their, and their, uh, standing in the world.
And the land is becoming beautiful. Again, et cetera, et cetera. It's impossible for Americans not to see this as a vindication of these ideals that they developed in ways that had nothing originally to do with the Jews at. Were simply the products of the American spirit and American history.
Vanessa: So in some ways then the kind of origins of American support for Israel is because it's a manifestation of the American way in the middle east. Is that accurate?
Walter Russell Mead: That would be, you know, they would see this again as, as indicating the ability of American principles to reanimate even the most desperate conditions. And they, you know, they, um, and they believed, uh, in the 1940s, you heard this a lot among American pro Zionist, that Israel would become a very successful country.
And then it would be a model for the rest of the developing world. Israel would point the way for other countries because they would see this example and be inspired by it so that they saw this as another stage in the regeneration and development of the world. Again, for religious people, a recovery from the tragedy of the fall of man and for secular people, the spirit of progress, overcoming all obstacles.
Vanessa: Is, is there a distinction though between this kind of, uh, sentiment, I guess, towards Israel in terms of the period in American history too, you, because when you're, when you're discussing, I'm thinking of, I, I remember you wrote about the Blackstone Memorial and all of this widespread support for the idea of Israel way before Israel was an idea on the table for, uh, for the world. Uh, but yet by the time Israel actually starts to come into creation. There's a lack of support, right? Because it's not a, a particularly, uh, strong ally. And so America's not interested in being an ally of Israel. So is this, is this a sentiment that kind of ebbs and flows? And, and if so, why?
Adaam: Sorry, I'm gonna do the thing that we said we're not gonna do. And, and, and tack a question on top of a question. because actually I think connects cuz I, I, I think a lot of this has to do with, um, and I'm gonna expand on this later to not distract you from Vanessa's question, but it has to, at least in part it has to do with the belief that historical progress is almost Gallian and it's gonna take shape without need for direct involvement. These things are, uh, deterministic, mechanistic, manifestation. You might support it passively, but you don't need to actually act it out. You don't need to bring it into action yourself. That's least that's the way I see it. And cuz I see that as core to American foreign policy in many eras that we are gonna sit back and let history unfold on its own into the destiny. That is an American world.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, I'm gonna, I will say that probably Haal very few UN very few American policy makers would welcome. I was, yes. I thought about that. Well, actually I, I think this actually is an important difference in the way that sort of Jewish culture thinks about the, the, the end times or the climax of history and the way that American slash Christian culture does, which that in Judaism, there really is the idea that you can either.
Hasen the arrival of redemption by living a good life and doing good deeds, or you can postpone it by doing bad deeds. Or abstaining from good deeds. And so, you know, this idea in Christianity is, is, is absent from Christianity where it's, God's Providence entirely up to him. And there's nothing you can do that will make God, you know, Jesus come back faster nor can anything you do delay the day of the coming. It's just, will you be ready yourself or not?
Adaam: Right. Right. Probably Calvinism was more of an influence than ha Guild.
Walter Russell Mead: Right. But, okay, well right. Secularized Calvinism, which is kind of the default ideology, I think of the, um, you know, which is predestined predestination based basically on iron laws of causation.
So Calvin is predestination without God, um, is I think the default ideology of a lot of the American inte Genia Hael is not all that far from it himself. Um, But, uh, for quite similar cultural reasons. Right? Uh, but in any case, um, yeah, this, you know, there is, there was certainly a sense that America doesn't necessarily need to protect Israel.
You know, if it's, God's doing it will come. Uh, but there is all, but there is an idea, a different idea. That's more powerful among evangelical Christians than among many, which is their verses in the Bible that they take quite literally. One of them is, you know, God blesses those who bless Israel and curses, those who curse Israel so that, you know, you'll actually find people interpreting the fall of the British empire is a withdrawal of God's blessing for its opposition to Zionist should have stuck with a ball for declaration, you know?
Right. You know, should have the courage of your convictions. Um, and they would note that those were also years in which the British were abandoning their belief in God to a very large, large extent.
Adaam: It's very, it's very funny to think after the forties, that, that, that, um, that God's involvement in history is guided by deep concern for the fate of the Jews. But that's just me.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, you know, again, uh, uh, you know, God works in mysterious ways. , but there there's actually a great line. I think it's in a novel by Reynolds price. So one of the characters said, God works in mysterious ways. And so do I,
Adaam: I mean, I, I, I just fi I just find it so cute. The quaint, I just find it quaint to, to have that belief. And I can, I can totally imagine it being internally reconciled in people because, you know, we all hold insane contradictions and absurdities, but to. Think, ah, the, the, the Brits abandoned the Jews and therefore their empire will slightly swivel and maybe they'll experience a cold winter and some famine. And as their global influence shrinks, the world will know his will, that nobody should mess with the Jews except for.dot.
Walter Russell Mead: Yeah. Well, it didn't work well for Germany either than 1940s, I could say.
Adaam: Yeah, but I take the hot take that it turned out worse for the Jews,
Walter Russell Mead: you know, look, but aside from sort of questions of theodicy here, right. let you know, um, the things that, that for Americans, you have to remember that the cold war becomes then the central contest of good and evil in the late forties and early fifties. Cause their experience is, you know, We turn our back on the rest of the world in the 1930s. And what do we get a depression and then a world war. And not only that, a world war against the forces of true evil, right? Japan and Germany, then immediately afterwards, we try to turn our back again. And what happens like Stalin kills even more has killed even more people than Hitler. Ma is marching in China.
And these people, you know, they EV vow that they hate God. They hate religion. They hate America. They hate everything about us and basically will kill us if they get the chance. You'll be lucky if they just send your kids to a ULA, that'll be the lucky ones. Oh. And they have mus and they have nukes. Exactly. So you have, you know, you, the, the total focus of American thinking about the world goes to that.
Both American foreign policy and American public opinion tend to center there. And Israel in the forties and fifties is not an asset as American. See it to their cold war strategy. Now we can also add, by the way, as I read about in the book,
Stalin actually did a lot more to, uh, support the creation Israel love than Truman did. And actually, what, what the Israelis did was behind America's back. They, uh, transferred badly needed hard currency to CCHO Slovakia, which helped the check communist solidified their control following their, their coup and which also, uh, enabled Stalin basically to keep them out of the Marshall plan VO, you know, it strength Israel STR deliberately and not knowingly took actions that strengthened Stalin's hand against the United States.
Now the Americans don't know this in the spring of 1948, as far as I've been able to see that knowledge filters in later. But if you wanna understand why the Eisenhower state department absolutely focused on the fight against communism really had a problem with Israel, it's not hard to see why that would be the case.
Adaam: Also, a moment to go back, be to the brief moment when Stalin is, is playing his Zionist card, um, in between, um, you know, planning to purge all the Jews and being completely, uh, um, anti Zionist is seeing it as an internationalist cabal. Um, in that brief moment, it's a great reflection and that's why I loved the Truman chapters, the Truman section in your book, cuz it's an.
A perfect encapsulation of how history is not a narrative. It, it is not a, a path or a destiny, but is the result of human decisions and political interests that just shift in collide and random occurrences. Yes. The total chaos of history is on display. So if you can talk about the styling moment and how it ended up pressing Truman to, to pull the trigger.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, you know, the, you have to start here one of the legends in a sense where both, um, sort of the American Jewish community in its collective memory and, you know, anti-Semites, and anti-Israel conspiracy think. Combine is this idea that it was America, the American Jewish political pressure on Harry Truman in 19 47, 48 is what drove his Israel policy.
And that's, that's kind of a standard reading of the history that both pro-Israel and anti-Israel people have tended to collude in, but you really look at what was happening
Adaam: for, for the anti-Israel obviously it's the, the notion of, of sneaky, um, Jewish intervention and for Jews, it's the story, or at least for Zionist, it's the story of a very effective, like the most effective act of diplomacy on the part of hiim invites man and the Zionist apparatus.
Walter Russell Mead: Correct. And it's also in America for the American Jewish community. There's especially little Eddie, Jacob. At a key moment. Truman's old business partner from Missouri, you know, a one small, not famous, not rich Jew from the hinterland comes into the white house and like queen Esther in the Bible. He pleads the case of his people to the moody Gentile ruler and Truman listens. And Kaen Wessman is invited in and then there's a conversation and Israel is saved and the littlest American Jew can move mountains. All right.
That really is a story that is important in the, in the American Jewish community, at least in, in parts of it. Um, and parts of that story are true. You know, uh, Eddie Jacobson did get into see Truman Truman was very moody and, uh, and, and Jacobson did persuade him to see Weissman and Truman.
And Viceman Matt. But what is very interesting is that after the meeting Truman did not change his policy and Truman continued to actually try to prevent the declaration of Jew of Israeli independence right up until the declaration was signed. The last thing, the Israeli authorities, well, the time that the, you should of the, the Jewish community in Palestine, the LA last thing it did before declaring independence was to vote, to reject an American request for delay Truman had offered to send his private plane with anybody who wanted to mediate to try to, to, to stave this off. So Eddie Jacobson did not change Truman's policy. Uh, neither did KA Viceman. Um, Truman was, was all along, trying to solve a, a bigger problem in American foreign policy.
And that is that, um, after the end of the second world war American liberals had sort of two ideas and, and they were the dominant force in the democratic party.
They were led by Henry Wallace who had been Roosevelt's vice president and Eleanor Roosevelt Roosevelt's widow. And they wanted to follow Roosevelt's world war II policy, which was to kind of conciliate, Stalin and base American policy on trying to win Stalin's trust while working through the United nations as the chief seat of diplomacy, because only the United as strong United nations could prevent world Wari in a nuclear era,
Adaam: an incipient institution, right. It existed for what, all of, uh, a year at that point.
Walter Russell Mead: Yeah, it was very, very new. And, and the hopes for it were, you know, we look back on them as kind of sad to see what people hoped it could become. But th those hopes were very real in the aftermath of a terrible war. Um, their psychological hold was very strong on a lot of people.
Um, and truman saw fairly early that Stalin could not be trusted. There was absolutely no way the United States could reach an agreement with Stalin and he was, and if you were really gonna oppose Stalin, you kind of had to work with Britain, cuz there was no one else left to work with. No one was left standing after world war.
So, um, uh, how do you, but the democratic party doesn't believe this and doesn't like Truman. Uh, he was, you know, that liberals hated him. Truman is constantly trying to manage the pressure from the left in his administration. And his biggest stroke of luck is that in, uh, the winter of 1947, the British economy collapses due to huge storms and a big freeze in, in England. And they, they give up the empire. They basically say, we're getting out of India, whether there's an agreement between the Muslims and the Hindus or not, we're gonna pull out of Greece and Turkey and the Americans. That's what drives the Americans to do the Marshall plan. And we're gonna throw the Palestine mandate, which they got for under the league of nations.
We're gonna give that to the UN and, and wash our hands of the future of Palestine. So at that point, Truman can separate the Palestine issue from us. British relations. Is this a side note?
Because again, my part of my interest here is just to see how the, the history of ideas has, uh, a narratives has a much smaller part to play than the sheer chaos of decision making, abandoning the mandate and their presence in India.
It was not because the British government and public turned against the project of empire building. All of a sudden, both parties agreed about that. Maybe there was debate about the, the, the size and extent of the empire, but there was a consensus that empire was a good thing. What changed was that in 1947, they suddenly couldn't afford to keep it anymore.
Right? Well, they had to try to find cheaper ways to, to advance their national interests. Which, you know, and they, and they worked at it. They continued to play the Arab card against the Israelis right up through Suez. Um, you know, so they didn't completely throw in the, the cards after this, but they, they knew they couldn't afford an army in Palestine fighting war against the Jews.
Um, and so once that happens, um, in, in the us truman then immediately says, yes, let the UN decide. And you have to understand what an important thing that was for people. These wars, we think of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, almost as this unique thing, but to people of the time, it looked a lot like these conflicts that have been driving Europeans in the world crazy for a hundred years, Bulgarian versus Macedonians, Croats versus Serbs, Pauls versus Germans and Russians, Germans and French over Al Sasine. Greeks and Turks, these national conflicts between people had been the cause of war after war after war. And because these smaller conflicts would draw in the great powers, that's how you would get to the great wars. And so the hope was that the UN could settle this question, uh, peacefully, the Israeli Palestinian question.
And when Truman said I'm gonna support the UN decision. He immediately, the democratic liberals are happy with that idea. Um, and then, you know, the Zionists are trying to get Truman to say, okay, well now you're the us the most powerful country in the, in the world you need to get in there and make sure the UN does the right thing.
Truman says, oh, I can't violate the sacred independence of the United States. He, he says, no, no, no. We will not even be on the committee to decide hands off, let the UN work. And the Zionist are frustrated, but the liberals are thrilled and that's, it was the liberals, not the Zionists who were chief who chiefly, concerned, Truman politically,
then, all right. Then the Soviet union endorses partition, which again, to liberals, looks like, wow, the us and the Soviet union acting through the UN are mandating a peaceful resolution for a national. This is it, this is the Dawn of peace. This is what foreign policy needs to be. And it's working. Thank God. Or
Adaam: this was patented Russian trolling
Walter Russell Mead: well, you know, Stalin stalin was a very clever man. He thought a lot about what he did, but it really did, you know, but then the problem is immediately after the UN votes for partition, um, the Arabs reject it and they have, you know, as I say in the book, they actually have a pretty good moral claim. They say, look, you know, Britain didn't get this from the league of nations.
It was Imperial banditry. They took it from the Ottoman empire after the war, and then gave it to the Jews in the Bauer declaration without any consent of the, in of the inhabitants of the land. This is imperialism. This is not moralism. And the UN can have no right to do what is wrong. So it was a principled stand, but for American liberals, this was totally unacceptable because you know what?
We all have to compromise. If we're gonna avoid world Wari and have the rule of law, everybody has to give a bit and get a bit, et cetera. So when the Jews accept the partition plan and the Arabs reject it, then support for Israel becomes a liberal as well as a Zionist. Cause
Adaam: the, the reason that, that this also connects to Stalin is not just the pressure of the UN vote is the fact that by, by, um, helping the Zionist, Yahoo get weapons when no other country is, um, supporting it, it gave it leverage that it would not have otherwise had
Walter Russell Mead: well that's you see the thing immediately after the partition vote, the state department imposes an arms embargo on the reach. The Zionists are furious because after all, oh my goodness, this is like the embargo on Franco Spain. It helps the bad guys and hurts the good guys, the embargo on, on all of Spain and the British can supply the Arabs with weapons. It's an American embargo, but the Jews have no place to get them right. Stalin. Then that's when stalin tells the Israelis through intermediaries that they can buy, not just any weapons, but weapons that the SCDA arms factory in Czechoslovakia had made for the ox and which were, were still, still. In their crates when the, when the Germans surrendered. So Stalin supplies, the Israelis with Nazi arms,
Adaam: some beautiful poetic history there.
Walter Russell Mead: Uh, and that's, you know, that turns the military tide literally turns the tide in the war because in the winter of 1948, the Jews are actually losing the war. And even as late as, um, the first week of independence, that's when the Etson block falls to really the first intervention by a professional Arab army, the Jordanians.
So almost all the leading military opinion, uh, field Marshall, Montgomery, general Marshall in the us believes that the Arabs are gonna win the war, but they don't know that Stalin is providing this steady stream of high quality weapons.
Just to put all those threats together. Cause this is just, what's so interesting to me about this.
You have the chaotic systems that lead the British to leave the mandate when they do like the bad winter, the famine, which to the world then seems to almost guarantee implosion in Palestine in terms of American policy, they see it almost inevitably ending with one genocide or another. Yeah. The moment that there is no more British policing in the region.
And then they have to decide how to handle this Truman for domestic political expediency decides to defer to the UN, which ends up supporting partition and which gives some moral standing to the Zionist. Tohu all while for completely different geopolitical strategies. The Yeshu gets from Stalin, the weapons, it desperately needs in order to avert complete and total collapse.
And if it weren't for this dynamic of power, not only that Yeshu would not have declared independence, the us would probably have not been compelled. To necessarily, um, um, support independence in the UN because they realized that as things stood, Stalin was gonna get in front of it and support independence for the Jewish issue, meaning that the us couldn't stay neutral.
So put together, it's just such a beautiful painting of chaos that forced Truman's hand more than any conversation with Heim Byman.
You could say that not since the red sea is such a random constellation of events led to such a dramatic result.
Vanessa: so, so I wanted to close the loop on the previous question, cuz I, I, I still, I'm still a little bit uncertain about how America shifts to this point from that previous point.
And I threw out the term Blackstone Memorial without actually explaining it. So I think it might be, it might be if you wouldn't mind explaining that moment in American history, To, to those moment that we just talked about kind of with the creation of Israel and how the Amer and how American in, uh, history is influencing the way we're, we're thinking about an, a Jewish state.
Okay. And then I want us to get to today, cuz I definitely don't wanna let you leave without talking about today. All right.
Walter Russell Mead: Look. Well, one of the things in, in trying to show the importance of non-Jewish American support in American history and to show the roots of American support for the idea of a Jewish state in the middle east, I look at this mysterious document called the Blackstone Memorial, which is delivered to president Benjamin Harrison.
Um, a couple of years before Hersel wrote dear UIN shot. And when there really was no seriously large scale organized Jewish Zionist movement at all, and this is a petition asking the us to use its diplomatic influence. To get other countries to use their influence, to get the Ottoman Salton, to declare a Jewish national home in Palestine.
And it's signed this petition is signed by John D Rockefeller, JP Morgan, the chief justice of the United States, the speaker of the house of representatives and a whole galaxy of important influential American establishment figures. Uh, and this, you know, the, uh, but this Memorial is limited in what it asked the president to do.
It's just, it doesn't say send troops to establish. It doesn't say America should directly impose this on the Salton right. Diplomatic influence to achieve a Jewish state. And if you look at it that actually defines American policy right up through the Truman administration, you know, and pro Zionist lobbying could never push us presidents to go farther than those Blackstone principles, diplomatic support, um, and anti Zionist could never get the us to take it off the table, but it has remained.
And actually a hundred years ago in September, uh, September, 1922, almost exactly a hundred years ago as we speak. Huge majorities in both houses of Congress, bipartisan majorities embodied the B for declaration into American law as a reflection of these Blackstone principles, so to speak. Um, and for Zionists, it was a very frustrating thing because the us was on for many Jews.
The us was on the record as diplomatic support. But then when there were issues like the British start to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine, the United States, you know, is perfectly willing to have a diploma, an ambassador say to the British, my dear chaps. I wish you would allow more Jews in, but when they say, well, no, we're too worried about what mu might do or whatever.
That's the end of the conversation. So it's, it is kind of, and just ironically, um, in that same period of time, the us Congress almost the same year as the Blackstone Memorial was as the Bauer declarations put into law. The us Congress did the single most important thing the us has ever done, uh, uh, for the state of Israel, which was at banned mass migration from Europe to the United States, without immigration restriction in, and again, this you could argue is anti-Semites helping Israel, uh, without the ban on Jewish immigration affected ban on Jewish immigration in the us after 1924, some still got in, but mu like 10% or less of previous numbers
Adaam: and the ban was not directed at jews.
Walter Russell Mead: No, it was well, it was, it was directed at mass immigration from Eastern Europe, which can coincidentally where the countries, where Jews also would live in, but yet hit the polls, the Italians, the Greeks, it's the Russians, et cetera, as well as the Jews and German Jews, ironically had better chances of getting in than Polish Jews.
But, um, That act was, was entirely rejected by the American Jewish community while the American Jewish community was much more divided in its attitude toward the Bauer declaration. The most prominent American Jews of the day were totally opposed, both Zionism and to the Zal Alford declaration.
Vanessa: It's important to, to just emphasize one of your main points, which is the creation creation of a Jewish state has a lot less to do with what Jews have ever wanted. And it has a lot more to do with what non-Jews have wanted as a right quote unquote solution to the problem.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, I did consider making the subtitle of the book don't blame Israel on the Jews. Right. But it it's clear it, it really did become clear to me on the research of this, that the secret weapon of the Zionist was never. Massive Jewish power and influence wielded in the conspiratorial way that anti-Semites always think it is it's that the Zionist project was the only project for the survival of a significant number of Jews that could get just enough Jew, uh, non-Jewish support. So that with incredibly intense work and dedication, you could make it work.
The other sort of programs for Jewish survival that were kicking around say in 1900 were, you know, number one, let us be just like, let us live as Jews, religious Jews, not religious. Don't bother us. Let us be. And the Jews could not get that one done. Yeah. You know, wouldn't happen. The second one is okay, well, if you won't do that, at least let us move to some place where we can live freely. But one by one, the countries of the world effectively shut their doors to Jewish migration.
Adaam: With the famous quote from the Australian delegation that I love reminding my Australian friends, uh, from the Evian conference, I think it's, uh, 37 or 38, they're saying, well, we do not quite have a Jewish problem.
And we'd rather not import one.
Walter Russell Mead: We have a right. We, we don't have a race problem. Right,
Adaam: right. And we'd rather not import one because if Australian history is known for one thing, it's the lack of racial
Walter Russell Mead: tensions. Yes but the, so the, the, the weirdest of those three projects, the least likely the crazy idea as it literally struck all kinds of people in 1900 that a Jewish state be constructed in the middle east, turned out to be the only one that was practical.
And that is where Zionism gets its success. And what made it practical was the combination that Zionism could mobilize the effort of Zionist. You know, what is it, another acre, another goat, the incredible hard, hard backbreaking work and poverty and everything else to build the state. Um, but also the political thing of building a state, not simply a colony. Um,
Adaam: so I, I, I, I think this dynamic is part of what complicates, uh, the asinine discussion about what counts as antisemitism is anti Zionism, antisemitism, or not because. It not just today where so many Jews, um, American Jews and European Jews have, um, severe reservations about the state of Israel and its conduct.
As, as you point out historically, there is very little link or, or, and, and the link is not guaranteed at all between, between the success of Zionism and Jewish public opinion. But at the same time, you see how talk about the power of Zionism is still infused by the perception of a Jewish cabal pooling strings, right?
So I wanna move to today and what better place to start than, uh, our source of knowledge, Twitter, which I don't know if you frequent. So last week, journalism mad laces of slow, boring had this to say, and I'd love your reaction. He wrote the Iran deal is good for the United States and good for Iran.
That's what makes it a deal. Because it's good for Iran. Some other countries in the region, don't like it, which I totally get, but these are quote unquote allies that don't do anything for America. And then he adds a meme showing I receive support in regional conflicts with adversaries, you receive literally nothing.
Obviously also talks about Saudi Arabia and he mentions the, uh, the tepid response from Saudi Arabia in terms of alleviating gas prices, which I don't know if we fully understand how, how much the Biden trip there, uh, worked out, but, but he obviously also implies Israel and, and specifically he points out that, um, Israel's only contribution to the us right now in terms of its Alliance is intelligence about Iran.
In other words, the only thing that Israel is worth as an ally according Tolas is being able to provide intelligence about the original enemy. It needs the us to combat.
Do you agree?
Walter Russell Mead: Look, I think, uh, I ask myself sometimes what would happen if Israel decided that it no longer wanted to be an American ally, um, or America decided that it no longer wanted to be an Israeli ally. And so Israel had to go shopping. All right. Would Israel be able to find new allies? Absolutely. You know, Russia, China, India, Japan, other countries would stand in line to be Israel's all. Um, it's tech, uh, capabilities, its intelligence, which is not only about Iran. It knows many things about many people that Americans and others would like to know, but also it's deep knowledge of American tech and American, uh, uh, planning.
Uh, these are tremendous assets. Um, and this, this, again, some of this traces back to a kind of fantasy that poor little Israel has no, you know, is so dependent on the United States that it really doesn't dare. You know, if we put our foot down, it wouldn't dare it to cross us. And if we, if we just wrote it off, it would suffer and we would not, that is not the reality of this relationship.
Um, in fact, I, you know, uh, it, it strikes me as just remarkable, you know, for year decades, American presence. Would've given anything, they had to get peace between Israel and more Arab states. We have this handed to us now, essentially on a PLA, um, and rather than being part of a de you know, rather than people being able to argue that Israel is a destabilizing force in the middle east, clearly the sort of creation of a golf defense community with Israel involved and sort of economic links that are developing.
And all you know, is, is, is in the American interests. Um, I guess implicitly, um, if I read it as charitably as possible, though, it didn't make that explicit. The benefit of the Iran deal to the us would mean less headaches in the middle east, and therefore more bandwidth to focus on China, right. Is that
I don't believe that, um, I look at places in the middle east where Iran has a lot of influence, you know, and what do we look at Iraq?
Uh, look at Lebanon, look at Siri, look at Yemen poster, boy, first ability do we actually want more of the middle east to look like that? Do we want Iran essentially to intimidate other countries? Do we want the Saudis and the Israelis to be so concerned with the declining value and the, and the Emiratis and others of American security assurances that they turn to the Chinese or these days?
I think the Chinese and the Russians, um, this is, this is not something we want. Um, there is, I, it, it's important though, in, in trying to understand how people think about this. I think that it's important to understand that the democratic parties dislike of Saudi Arabia. Has about 70 years of history to it.
It actually goes back to the early cold war. When, when the Democrats were angry at the Eisenhower administration for siding with the Arabs against Israel, and they saw this as siding with oil companies and, and arbitrary rulers against demo democracy. Right then in the seventies you get the, a, the oil embargo and the price hikes.
And so the Saudis are like, you know, the, the great traders who are stabbing us in the back on oil prices and destroying the living standards of blue collar Americans by unconscionable monopoly behavior. Then you get to, um, uh, 9 1 1, and it's this, you know, 19 Saudis or whatever on that plane. And the Saudis are good friends of the Bush family, the Bush family, and the Saudi Royal friends have a connection.
So we forget it now. But George W. Bush was once just almost as much hated as Trump is. And the Saudi sort of connection with him was massively infuriating. And then of course the, the next stage is Saudi opposition to the Iran deal of the sainted president Obama. And beyond that, then Saudi as the largest producer, outside the us of hydrocarbons and destroying the planet and encouraging the addiction to oil.
Adaam: So you're saying the hatred of Saudi Arabia was an overdetermined question.
Walter Russell Mead: Yes, exactly. And so that people, a lot of people look at the middle east through a lens in which this view of Saudi Arabia is really deeply entrenched.
Now I am not here to make the case for Saudi Arabia, land of tolerance and freedom. um, nor am I, you know, here to make the case for let's burn all the oil we can and the heck with the atmosphere, but national, the national interest is a very complex thing. And sometimes, uh, you know, almost no matter who in the middle east, we're gonna be working with people, uh, who in, in certain very basic ways, see things differently and behave differently than we do.
Adaam: What I find funny is that it also seems to assume that Israel is just gonna take it. If Iran becomes a nuclear Powers's opinion, doesn't seem to really factor in the dis power to the world. If Israel decides to go to war against Iran, especially considering that China will inevitably play some role in this.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, this, again, this is, I think, you know, the real problem is I don't think the Iran nuclear deal as I am not against, by the way, um, a nuclear deal with Iran. And I, I would've, I, I was sorry that president Trump, uh, left the deal.
Adaam: Right. But returning to a similarly structured deal, two, three years after Iran has gained more nuclear advantage, um, as if nothing's happened is insane.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, again, what I said that even, even before that, what I would say is that, however, the Iran deal did not contribute to regional stabilization, which is the American goal. Is because Iran doubled down on its destabilizing activities around the region and because other countries so alarmed by the prospect that the us was negotiating the, on the nuclear front, but not on the conventional front and the destabilization front.
And then the us seemed to be in fact, wanting to use the Iran deal as a, as a reason to get out of the middle east, leaving them more exposed to a stronger Iran. Actually the Iran deal contributed to destabilization in the region. And I think it's, that's still happening just to be fair that the inability to predict or really think through the foreign policy decisions is not just on the Iran, the pro Iran deal side, because as we know, Trump's pulling out of the Iran deal also, and the, um, maximum pressure policy.
Actually incentivized a lot of creativity inside Iran that made it more insulated. And for instance, it developed its own halal internet that allow that, that basically made it much more difficult for dissidents inside the country to communicate with the rest of the world. Let's just say that, you know, if you think that that sanctions are enough to change your regimes, nuclear behavior study the history of North Korea
And one of the interesting things by the way, was that during COVID just five more years, just, we were just
Adaam: five more years away before this collapses
Walter Russell Mead: that during COVID North Korea actually imposed sanctions on itself in isolation, much tougher than anything the international community would ever be able to impose, you know, to the point of actual starvation for people
And so that's kind of a demo. I, I don't see the mus being moved by sanctions alone and that, um, Anybody who thinks that that's a resolution, has it wrong.
And in fairness, the Obama doctrine, at least in theory, was the Iran deal was supposed to give them more time to encourage popular resistance, not thinking that this is, and, and that again is equally elusory.
Um, these regimes have studied. Goof died recently. These regimes have all studied China, Russia, Iran, what liberalization means they, they, they're not gonna go down the Gobi GLA Austin Parisa thing again. And it's a total illusion that they're, that, you know, I mean, miracles can happen, but short of that, um, Iran is not the moderates in Iran. Aren't on the verge of pulling off a great liberal. Okay,
Vanessa: I'm gonna sneak in my, my closing question here. And I'm gonna say it fast, hopefully. So we talked earlier about the, kind of the plan, a plan B plan C, and that, uh, the, the Jewish state was actually plan C, but there is an argument that plan a is feasible.
The plan to have, uh, countries just allow Jewish people to be. And I think this probably one of the strongest arguments for that case is America and Amer and the liberal democracy in America. Mm-hmm so one of the things we've talked a lot, a lot in this podcast is why liberal democracy matters and why we have to safeguard it.
So for my final question to you, Walter, I'd like to hear you hear your case for, uh, if liberal democracy has a chance to actually safeguard. Minority populations like the Jewish peoples as a viable, uh, means of, of protecting not just Jewish peoples, but all, all kind of minorities in, in america society.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, one thing I would say is probably, that's not the best way to try to frame the debate over liberal democracy is good for the Jews. Right. There might be better, but I look, I think it is true.
Adaam: No, but I think what the bigger question is like is can do we, is there still hope for the idea of a liberal democracy actually safeguarding minorities, right, right. Or is that also an illusion of the enlightenment?
Walter Russell Mead: Right? Let's remember that, um, Israel is because they say in the book, israel is a country of Jews for whom HERL was right. That liberalism would not save the Jews. America is a country of Jews for whom Hersel was wrong, where liberalism did save the Jews.
I think what this tells us is that there's nothing set in stone here. There's nothing, there's no automaticity. Um, I think in general, Jews can do well under liberal democracy, but I note that Weimar Germany was a liberal democracy. So there we are in a way, uh, I don't think you can give a categorical answer.
I think we should fight for liberal democracy because it is the least bad of all forms of government. I think we should uphold the American idea because it does provide a common intent under which people can rally without having to give. The elements of their own communities and lives and identities that make sense to them. But you know, I'm a historian, I'm not a prophet, so mm-hmm, I'll stop there.
Vanessa: Yeah. My add on would just be, we need to safeguard the things that, that keep, that allow these, uh, principles to, to safeguard the rights and everything. That's, that's
Walter Russell Mead: the only thing I I'm all for liberal democracy and I'm all, I, you know, I'm four square for the American constitution. Let me just put that on the record.
Adaam: so in the last minute, uh, what do you think about the Israeli Palestinian peace process?
Walter Russell Mead: Uh, I, I would like it to succeed. I don't see a lot of short term prospect for that happening.
Adaam: And you should read the book yes. To learn about the McGuffin, the arc of the covenant. Thank you so much, much. This was fantastic.
Walter Russell Mead: Well, thank you. When does it go up? By the way?
Adaam: The eternal question asked again, you can follow Walter at w R Mead on Twitter, and you can follow at uncertain pod. Thank you for listening to uncertain things. We are uncertain doubs.com or wherever you get your podcast. Share us with your friends and enemies. And if you are feeling generous, give us a five star review on apple podcast until next time stay sane.